For the future Smart Grid, devices called Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are being widely deployed to continuously monitor the state of the power grid in real-time. The voltage and current phasor measurements are synchronized across the network using GPS. However, because civilian GPS signals are unencrypted, these receivers are susceptible to being spoofed.
INTRODUCTION
In Title XIII of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), the U.S. government endorsed a new, major effort to modernize the North American electric power grid with the creation of the "Smart Grid" [1] . The EISA officially defined the Smart Grid and described its key elements, including the implementation of a wide-area network of measurement devices to monitor the power grid state. Currently, this feature is largely comprised of a network of nearly 2000 Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), devices that measure voltage and current phasors at critical substations [2] , tagging each with a precise time-stamp using GPS. A map of the widely dispersed PMU network is shown in Fig. 1 . [2] Because civilian GPS signals are unencrypted, they are susceptible to being spoofed [3] . For the future power grid, this vulnerability could be exploited to induce a false timing solution at one or more critical substations. The timing accuracy for PMU devices must be correct to within 26 µs for a 60 Hz system, according to the IEEE Std. C37.242-2013 [4] .
Timing inaccuracies significantly greater than this limit could induce a generator to trip [5] . At critical substations, the resulting additional load placed on neighboring stations could induce these generators to trip, potentially leading to cascading failures and large-scale blackouts, similar to the Northeastern Blackout of 2003 [6] . These outages are not only costly, with an estimated $6 billion for the Northeastern Blackout [7] , but can also be harmful to the public and possibly lethal. In fact, evaluation of the effects of the Northeastern Blackout on New York City show that mortality rates increased by nearly 25% during August 2003, the month of the power outage [8] .
To manipulate the PMU timing, GPS spoofing can be performed in several ways. We describe three main types of attacks:
Meaconing
During meaconing, also known as a record-and-replay attack, the spoofer records a GPS signal and re-broadcasts it at a later time. However, besides revealing the spoofer's position, the attack must also initially force the victim receiver to lose track of the authentic signal, such as by jamming the receiver for a sustained period of time, before broadcasting the recorded signal at a higher power to induce the receiver to adopt the false signal peak upon re-acquisiton. For the victim receiver, this initial jamming is a telltale sign that an attacker is present and is manipulating the received signal.
Data-Level Spoofing
To perform a data-level spoofing attack, the spoofer provides the victim receiver with false navigation data bits corresponding to a false solution. This type of attack can be performed in a similar fashion as the signal-level spoofing attack described in 1.3, by steering the receiver tracking loops away from the authentic signal before broadcasting false navigation data. Otherwise, the spoofer could occasionally broadcast a phase-aligned nulling signal, which allows the receiver to maintain track of the authentic signal peak while flipping any desired data bits by broadcasting a matching GPS signal with opposite amplitude, at twice the signal power [9] .
Signal-Level Spoofing
During a signal-level (or measurement) spoofing attack, the spoofer manipulates the navigation solution of the victim receiver by first mimicking the authentic GPS signals, increasing the spoofing signal power to gain control of the receiver tracking loops, and then gradually steering the tracking loops to a false navigation solution [9] . This type of attack is the most difficult to detect for this application, due to the available resources for PMUs distributed across the power grid, including externally provided satellite ephemeris and access to an inertial timing reference, as well as the nature of the application, with well-known, stationary PMU sites. As a result, this type of spoofing attack will be the main focus of this work.
Proposed spoofing countermeasures include use of directional antennas to detect the angle-of-arrival of the incoming signal and comparing these measurements with the expected azimuth and elevation for each PRN [10] - [11] . This approach is useful for PMUs in the power grid, which are provided satellite ephemeris data from external sources and can thus immediately verify the received angle from each received satellite PRN signal. However, this approach could lead to misdetections of spoofing for satellites lower in elevation, and it is not immune to more complex spoofing attacks with multiple transmitters.
Another promising approach with Vestigial Signal Defense is to monitor distortions in the complex correlation domain, due to the interference of the authentic and spoofed signal peaks during the onset of an attack [12] . This would be especially useful for immediate, single-receiver authentication at each station. However, misdetections could occur if the attacker also broadcasts a nulling signal to remove the vestige of the authentic signal peak. Indeed, this type of attack would be challenging to execute effectively, for it requires precise carrier phase alignment with respect to the victim's received authentic signal.
Suggestions have also been made to modify the civilian signal structure to include an encrypted sequence of bits in the navigation message for authentication [13] - [14] or by using Spread Spectrum Security Codes (SSSCs) [15] - [16] . Because the currently broadcast civilian navigation messages (L1 C/A, L2C, and L5) do not use cryptographic techniques, these proposals are largely targeted toward the modern L1C signal, to be broadcast on the GPS Block III satellites and allowing for flexible message types, as well as the Galileo E1 OS signal. Thus, these suggestions may or may not be adopted in the future civilian GPS signals. However, the encrypted P(Y) military signals in the quadrature channel of the received signal can be presently utilized as an authentic signal signature for spoofing detection. The presence of the encrypted signal can be detected without knowledge of the precise bit sequence, by correlating the received quadrature-phase channel with that of a trusted reference station [17] - [19] .
In our prior work, we have shown that a receiver can be authenticated for GPS spoofing by using a handful of inexpensive cross-check receivers [20] - [21] . This work extends our previous work to a multi-receiver hybrid communication architecture, which authenticates the received signal at each PMU in the widely dispersed network. We further consider the potential for a coordinated spoofing attack against regional collections of cross-check receivers and generate regionally representative snippets to compare with distant network sites, while reducing bandwidth requirements. Additionally, we test our spoofing detection system with real-world GPS spoofing scenarios recorded during a government-sponsored live-sky spoofing event, demonstrating our algorithm can successfully evaluate the authenticity of a widely dispersed network of receivers. This paper is based on our recent ION GNSS+ 2018 conference paper [28] .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes our hybrid communication architecture, Section III explains the multi-receiver spoofing detection algorithm in detail, Section IV presents our experimental results, and Section V concludes the paper.
COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
Our proposed method of communication between PMU stations is through a hybrid network architecture, with centralized regional sub-networks, which connect to other sub-networks in a distributed manner. This architecture is designed to overlay a proposed structure for the power grid communication network, by the North American Synchrophasor Initiative. NASPI is a government-funded organization to enhance the efficiency and reliability of the future, modernized power grid by installing a large-scale network of PMU monitoring stations throughout the power grid network [22] .
NASPInet
The North American Synchrophasor Initiative network (NASPInet) is a proposed standardized communication infrastructure designed to allow communication of PMU data throughout the power grid network in an efficient and secure manner. This architecture was designed to be decentralized as well as expandable, in order to easily incorporate more devices as the measurement network grows [24] . Fig. 2 shows the conceptual architecture of NASPInet. [24] The architecture is made up of several PMU stations in regional sub-networks, also called monitoring centers, which transmit data to a central regional processing unit. This central unit is usually a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC), which synchronizes the received PMU data and utilizes it for a variety of applications related to sustaining the health of the power grid [23] . Then, through a Phasor Gateway unit, each of these sub-networks are connected in a distributed manner [24] .
Hybrid Architecture Network
Overlaying the NASPInet communication network, we will similarly have a large-scale distributed network of central processing stations, which are usually PDCs, each of which branches out to create a centralized, regional network of PMU devices, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . The Central Decision-Making Unit (CDMU) receives snippet samples from all receivers in its regional network. To continuously authenticate the received GPS signal, conditioned snippet samples must be regularly available for each satellite PRN signal received. See subsection 3.1 for details on the snippet conditioning process. As shown in Fig. 4 , upon receiving the regional PMU snippets, the CDMU conditions and performs pairwise cross-correlations between each pair of snippets, then aggregates the results to determine the preliminary spoofing decision. Next, the CDMUs in contact compare snippets to verify the preliminary spoofing decision, particularly to detect a more sophisticated, coordinated spoofing attack in the regional sub-network. To reduce bandwidth and processing requirements, the CDMU creates a regionally representative snippet from the signals initially evaluated to be authentic, and sends copies to other CDMUs in the distributed network. Upon receiving the representative snippets from distant sites, a second authentication step is performed to determine the final spoofing decision, which is returned to each PMU in the local network.
Snippet Data Format Considerations
These conditioned snippets could be generated at the receiver and sent directly to the CDMU, however this would require a significant amount of available bandwidth. In particular, for a desired signal authentication rate of f check Hz, a snippet length of T snip seconds, recorded at a sampling period of T s seconds and a data resolution of n res bits per sample, the bandwidth required W when the receiver observes N satellite PRNs can be represented as
By sending pre-conditioned snippets, this would allow for less processing required at the CDMU. However, to reduce bandwidth usage, as well as to eliminate processing requirements for participating receivers, a single raw GPS signal snippet could be sent, along with the corresponding signal tracking parameters for each PRN, to allow the central unit to generate the corresponding conditioned signal snippets.
Additionally, at a particular time of transmission, the corresponding signal from each satellite PRN is received at varying times at each PMU station. Thus, to ensure the received signal snippets from multiple PMU stations align over a span of T snip seconds, the PMUs must send slightly longer snippets. The temporal increase in sample length typically corresponds to approximately 20 ms, which is an insignificant increase in data length compared to the snippet sample lengths which typically provide strong signal peaks in our investigation. We denote this additional extension in the snippet length as T ext . Furthermore, to generate the regionally representative snippets for the latter part of our algorithm, we must precisely align snippets from multiple PMU stations. Thus, although the snippets sent from each PMU can be initially coarsely aligned with respect to the transmission time of interest, a slightly longer snippet sample should be sent corresponding to this margin of error.
An estimate of Doppler frequency and carrier phase is computed for each scalar tracking interval τ track , leading to a total set of Tsnip τ track signal parameters for the entire snippet. As a result, the alternative format for the data sent from a PMU station to the CDMU has the following bandwidth requirement:
where δt align represents the temporal alignment error of the snippet start from the desired time of transmission, and n f req , n phase , and n index represent the data size in bits for the Doppler frequency, carrier phase, and snippet starting indices for each PRN, respectively.
In Eq. (2), the second additive term in the parentheses is significantly smaller than the first, largely due to the reduced number of data values required for the signal parameters, corresponding to only one set per tracking period τ track . As a result, the bandwidth requirement for this alternative snippet format does not significantly increase with the number of visible PRNs. In fact, it is comparable to the bandwidth requirement for sending conditioned signal snippets for a single PRN at the same data resolution and authentication rate. Numerical values for the bandwidth used for our application are computed and further discussed in Section 4.1.
CDMU uses each set of signal parameters to generate a fraction of the carrier signal replica which corresponds to that particular scalar tracking time interval.
From the i th scalar tracking estimates for the Doppler frequencyf
for the k th received PRN, the CDMU generates a quadrature-phase replica of the corresponding carrier signal, similarly discretized to the sampling rate f s . From these estimates, the corresponding quadrature-phase carrier replica can be represented as [26] :
where t ∈ i · τ track , (i + 1) · τ track in discrete increments corresponding to the sampling period T s = 1/f s .
A total of M = Tsnip τ track fractional quadrature-phase replica signals are generated. The CDMU then concatenates these signal segments to create the complete carrier replica of temporal length T snip :
Once this replica is generated, the CDMU wipes off the carrier signal by simply multiplying the down-converted, digitized L1 signal snippet s k L1
[t] with the concatenated carrier replica from Eq. (5). At this point, assuming the tracking loops have converged to the received in-phase signal, the encrypted P(Y) signal lies in the quadrature-phase channel component, which the CDMU stores as the conditioned snippet for the k th visible PRN from the r th PMU receiver in the regional network:
Authentication within the Regional Network 3.2.1 Cross-correlating between Matching PRNs
Once all snippet samples from the regional network have been received and conditioned, for the particular time of transmission of interest, the CDMU performs pairwise cross-correlations between conditioned snippets from matching PRNs:
where m ri,k and m rj ,k represent the conditioned signal snippets for receivers r i and r j for PRN k. From this cross-correlation, the CDMU takes the value with the largest magnitude within a central range of indices, as represented in Eq. (8)
where δt align corresponds to the alignment accuracy between snippets from the regional network. This range restriction allows our algorithm to more reliably detect the true signal peak in the presence of noise, leading to more consistent results.
Evaluating the Pairwise Statistic
As in our previous work [21] , we next compute the pairwise statistic γ rirj ,k between the receiver pair (r i ,r j ) for PRN k:
where B rirj ,k is 1 if p rirj ,k lies above a threshold β pair , and 0 otherwise. The weighting constant w rirj ,k is defined as
where f signal (r i , r j , k) > 0 reflects the received signal quality in the resulting pairwise correlation, with a greater signal strength corresponding to a larger weight. Similarly, f dist (r i , r j ) reflects the relative distance between the two receivers in the pairwise statistic, with a greater distance corresponding to a larger weight. This weighting function is positive when i = j.
In this work, we define f signal to be the peak-to-noise ratio, or the ratio between the signal peak power and the noise floor power, computed from the cross-correlation of the receiver pair:
where C z rirj ,k [t] represents the pairwise cross-correlation, with the observed main signal peak set to zero, to avoid including the large signal peak when characterizing the background noise variance.
Similarly, we define f dist (r i , r j ) to be monotonically increasing as a function of the relative distance between receivers r i and r j with a monotonically decreasing, positive derivative. At a relative distance of 0 meters, f dist (r i r j ) also equals 0 and the weight asymptotically reaches a value of 1 as the distance becomes arbitrarily large.
Aggregating across the Regional Network
After evaluating the pairwise statistics, we compute the statistical contribution of PRN k to the overall preliminary spoofing statistic of each receiver in the network:
The statistical contribution of PRN k, denoted as A ri,k , reflects the similarity of the quadrature signal component of receiver r i with that of other receivers in the regional network for PRN k. Subsequently, to compute the preliminary spoofing statistic of receiver r i , we aggregate the statistical contributions of all visible PRNs for this receiver:
where N is the number of visible PRNs at receiver r i and {k 1 , . . . , k N } is the corresponding PRN list. From the preliminary spoofing statistic, we evaluate the preliminary spoofing decisionŜ ri , by checking if A ri exceeds a threshold α prelim :
By performing this computation for all receivers in the regional network, we finish evaluating the preliminary spoofing decision for each PMU. We next collect the receivers preliminarily determined to be authentic according to Eq. (15) . Large preliminary spoofing statistics, above the threshold α prelim , for this collection of receivers indicates a strong match of the quadrature signal component for the GPS signal received at these stations. This is likely due to the presence of the authentic P(Y) code in the quadrature channel of each signal, especially if the receivers are reasonably separated from each other in distance; however, similarly large preliminary statistics could also be induced during a sophisticated, coordinated spoofing attack against these receivers in the regional network.
Formation of Regionally Representative Snippets
To determine the final spoofing decision for the preliminarily authenticated receivers, we compare the matching quadraturephase signal received at these stations with signals from other, distant regional networks, via the distributed communication network between CDMUs. Rather than sending copies of all conditioned snippets initially determined to be authentic, the CDMU can send one regionally representative snippet for each PRN.
This regionally representative snippet provides a condense representation of the preliminarily authenticated quadrature-phase signal from the regional network. As a result, the bandwidth requirements will be greatly reduced for the distributed communication between CDMUs, which will likely have significantly less bandwidth available compared to the availability within each regional networks [27] . Furthermore, the processing load at each CDMU will also be reduced, corresponding to a shorter delay in determining the final spoofing decision for each PMU station.
Finely Aligning Authentic Snippets
Before combining the authentic signals to generate a regionally representative snippet, the authentic samples must be finely aligned to the nearest sample. To align the snippets received between a pair of receivers r i and r j for PRN k, we obtain the peak index of the cross-correlation between this pair of receivers, using the method described in subsection 3.2.1. The temporal shift corresponding to this index offset can be represented as:
where f s is the sampling frequency of the received signals. In this respect, we shift the signal snippet from receiver r j relative to the the snippet from receiver r i by the time difference τ rirj ,k , in order to align the two conditioned snippets for PRN k. As discussed in subsection 2.3, because the temporal shift can be as large as the worst-case alignment precision of δt align , each PMU provides the CDMU with a slightly longer raw signal snippet. An additional 2δt align seconds of data is transmitted to ensure a final, regionally representative snippet of T snip seconds can be generated for the received signal from each satellite.
This alignment process repeats for each of the other initially authenticated receivers in the regional network, by similarly shifting each snippet to align with the sample from receiver r i . The receiver referenced for this collective snippet alignment process, denoted r i , is chosen arbitrarily from the collection of authentic receivers. At this point, all preliminarily authenticated snippets are mutually, finely aligned in time. The corresponding relative time difference τ rirj ,k computed between receivers during this step is also useful for detecting a meaconing attack, as described in more detail in subsection 3.5.
Generating the Regionally Representative Snippet
With all of the initially authenticated signal snippets collectively aligned to the nearest sample index, we next perform a weighted summation of these signals to generate the regionally representative snippet. For the k th commonly received satellite PRN signal, the corresponding aligned snippet from each receiver r j is weighted by the statistical contribution A rj ,k , as defined in Eq. (13) . This quantity A rj ,k represents the ability to verify the authenticity of the signal received from the k th satellite PRN at receiver r j , based on the similarity of its quadrature signal component with other receivers in the regional network. The weighted signals from each authenticated receiver r j are then directly summed together and normalized to generate the regionally representative snippet for the local network n i :
By normalizing the signal, we ensure that the representative snippet m rep ni,k maintains the same overall signal strength as snippets from individual receivers within the regional network n i .
Evaluation of the Final Spoofing Decision
Once regionally representative snippets have been generated for each commonly received satellite PRN signal, the CDMU transmits each snippet to other distant regional networks via the distributed communication links. Correspondingly, the CDMU receives representative snippets from other distant networks. These distant snippets are compared with its own regionally representative snippet as well as with the original signal snippets from receivers that were preliminarily determined to be spoofed. A strong signal match of the representative snippet with the distant sites confirms that these initially authenticated receivers are indeed authentic, whereas a poor signal match would lead to the conclusion that these collection of receivers have been spoofed in a coordinated manner. Similarly, with the signal from the receiver(s) initially determined to be spoofed, a strong signal match with the distant signal samples would lead to the conclusion that the signal is indeed authentic. Otherwise, a poor signal match would confirm the lack of authenticity of the received signal.
Thus, for the k th satellite in common between the two regional networks, the CDMU cross-correlates each received, distant representative snippet m 
From each cross-correlation result C ninj ,k and C rqnj ,k , the CDMU computes the centralized signal peak using Eq. (8) and subsequently the peak-to-noise ratio, which can be represented as
where P N R(·) is defined in Eq. (12) . The quantity η ninj ,k represents the quality of the signal match between the regionally representative snippet with the distant snippet from network n j for PRN k. In the same manner, η rqnj ,k quantifies the degree of similarity between the distant representative snippet with the signal from receiver r q , which was initially determined not to be authentic when comparing within the regional network only. A sufficiently strong peak-to-noise ratio indicates a match with the corresponding distant network site. Similar to the steps in subsection 3.2.3, the computed peak-to-noise ratio is aggregated for all received satellite PRNs and for all distant network correlation results:
After aggregating across all PRNs, the CDMU smooths the secondary with a narrow moving average filter of width ν samples to reduce variability in the final statistic:
Next, we verify the secondary cumulative statistic B ni lies above a threshold α P N R , to determine the final spoofing decision S ni of the collection of preliminarily authenticated receivers. Similarly, the secondary cumulative statistic B rq is compared with the threshold to determine the final spoofing decision S rq for each of the receivers determined initially to be spoofed, where a decision of 1 corresponds to an authentic spoofing decision and 0 corresponds to a spoofed decision:
Detection during Meaconing
Because truly broadcasted GPS signals are recorded to perform meaconing, the authentic P(Y) encrypted codes will be present in the quadrature-phase channel of the received signal. As a result, a strong correlation peak will be observed, indicating the original signal was indeed transmitted from the true GPS satellites. To detect an anomalous time-delay induced by meaconing, the GPS receiver must have access to another timing source for reference. Indeed, the PMUs in the power grid also have a backup inertial clock, which is periodically maintained by the GPS receiver to avoid long-term drift.
In our prior work [21] , we describe the use of Position-Information Aiding, where we use the known location of the stationary PMUs, as well as the satellite ephemeris data provided via external sources to compare the relative received times of the GPS signal between stations within the power grid network. We use the same methodology from our prior work, presented here in the context of this hybrid architecture framework.
The CDMU would only need to check for meaconing with the receivers r i that have been authenticated for signal-level spoofing, as determined by evaluating the final spoofing decision S ri using Eq. (27) . Thus to authenticate the received satellite signals for a particular time of transmission t T x , each authenticated receiver r i sends the CDMU its estimated received timet R ri,k for the transmitted signal from each visible satellite k. The CDMU could also send these estimates, obtained from each receiver in its regional network, to other distant networks. This would in turn provide more timing reference data, and thus increased redundancy, while using a negligible amount of additional bandwidth.
After obtaining the estimated received time from all receivers in the regional network, the CDMU computes for each pair of receivers r i and r j the estimated difference in received times for the signal transmitted from satellite PRN k:
This estimated received time differenceδt rirj ,k is then be compared with the expected received time difference δt rirj ,k , computed from the relative known positions of the receivers r i and r j as well as satellite PRN k. Additionally, the expected received time difference incorporates estimated delays due to ionospheric and tropospheric effects. As in our prior work [21] , we use a similar approach as with the signal-level spoofing detection algorithm, where we first determine a pairwise meaconing statistic γ meac rirj ,k between receivers r i and r j for PRN k:
where τ R pair is the pairwise threshold for the deviation of the measured relative time delay from our computed expectation of the relative delay, and w rirj ,k is defined in Eq. (10) . Then, for a particular receiver r i , we similarly aggregate the pairwise statistic across all receiver pairs and visible satellites, to compute the resulting meaconing statistic A meac ri :
where N is the number of visible PRNs from receiver r i , with the corresponding PRN list {k 1 , . . . , k N }. As discussed in [21] , this meaconing statistic is similarly compared with a threshold to determine the meaconed decision.
Detection during Data-level Spoofing
During data-level spoofing, if the attacker first steers the receiver tracking loops away from the authentic signal peak, the quadrature channel of the tracked signal will no longer contain the encrypted P(Y) military signal, thus our algorithm will flag the attack. If the attacker does not manipulate the tracking loops of the receiver, and instead performs nulling to manipulate the navigation data bits, the encrypted P(Y) codes would indeed still lie in the quadrature channel of the tracked signal. However, since satellite ephemeris data is provided to the PMU externally through secured communication networks, this alternate method of attack would also still be readily detected.
EXPERIMENTATION 4.1 Experimental Setup
To verify our spoofing detection algorithm, we recorded GPS signals during a live-sky spoofing event in a western U.S. state. Simultaneously, we also recorded data at several other sites, including three sites in the United States (Champaign, Illinois; Boulder, Colorado; Cleveland, Ohio) as well as three sites in South America (Lima, Peru; Pachon, Chile; Tololo, Chile).
At each site, we used a lower sampling frequency of 2.5 M Hz, with a 32-bit data resolution for the spoofed station and Illinois station and an 8-bit data resolution at the other sites. Each station was equipped with a Universal Software-Defined Radio (USRP-N210), connected to a Novatel GPS antenna and triggered by a Chip-Scale Atomic Clock. Due to poor signal quality at lower satellite elevations, we used a slightly larger masking angle of 20
• . The collected raw GPS data was later post-processed using our research group's object-oriented, software-defined receiver written in Python, named PyGNSS.
For our experimentation, we used a snippet length of 500 ms and a scalar tracking interval of 1 ms. Additionally, we represented the Doppler frequency and carrier phase signal parameters with 8-byte floats. We also used a 4-byte unsigned integer to represent the starting index for each received PRN signal within the raw signal snippet. These data size parameters are defined in subsection 2.3 in more detail. Thus with 6 PRNs visible, according to Eq. (2), the condensed snippet format would require less than 50 KB to represent the tracked signal parameters and about 1300 KB to represent the extended raw data snippet for our application, assuming a coarse alignment of 1 ms with an 8-bit data resolution. This is comparable to sending a conditioned snippet for a single PRN at the same data resolution, which requires 1250 KB according to Eq. (1). Organizing the receivers above into a hybrid architecture as depicted in Fig. 5 , we define the following two regional networks: one with the U.S. receiver sites and another with the South American sites.
Examples of Cross-Correlation Plots
For the cross-correlation plots of conditioned signal snippets, we typically observe a single, large signal peak at the center. Fig. 6 shows an example of a typical cross-correlation plot. Furthermore, this correlation peak would be within the initial alignment error from the center index, which corresponds to ±1 ms from the central, zero-lag vertical line, for our coarse alignment application. Figure 7 : Noisy cross-correlation plot for conditioned snippets. For noisy correlation plots, there may be correlation points larger than the correct correlation peak. To avoid choosing the wrong peak value, we can more precisely align snippets using the time of transmission, rather than the received time and expected relative delay, then utilize knowledge of the initial alignment precision to more frequently pick out the correct cross-correlation peak through the noise. This allows our algorithm to perform better during noisy conditions, by reducing the number of misdetections during spoofing.
With noisier correlation plots, such as for satellites received at lower elevations, we still frequently observe a single large peak within ±1-milliseconds from the center. In fact, the data from our receiver in Tololo was particularly noisy and this was reflected in its cross-correlation plots. An example of this is shown in Fig. 7a , where by filtering the potential peaks using the initial alignment precision, the correct correlation peak was still picked out through the noise.
By more precisely aligning the conditioned snippets using the signal time of transmission, rather than the received time and expected relative delay with respect to other PMU stations, we can then utilize knowledge of the narrower initial alignment precision. This step reduces the number of misdetections during spoofing, since the resulting cross-correlation can occasionally have noisy, large correlation amplitude values. Fig. 7b shows an example of a noisy cross-correlation result between the spoofed receiver and the receiver located in Colorado.
Evaluating Preliminary Spoofing Decision
Examining 140 seconds of spoofed GPS data, with an authentication rate of 2 Hz, we computed the preliminary statistic for each receiver in the both of the regional networks. Considering the preliminary statistics from the authentic receivers, as well as from the spoofed receiver, we observe that these statistics appear to come from two separate distributions, both of which resemble a gamma distribution function, as plotted in Fig. 8 . The generalized gamma distribution function used to provide a probability distribution fit for the preliminary statistics takes the following form:
where γ(·) represents the gamma function: γ(α) = (α − 1)!. For the authentic preliminary statistics, the fitted distribution had parameters α = 27.2, c = 0.517, β = 1.82, and l = 486, whereas for the spoofed preliminary statistics, the distribution fit had parameters α = 11.3, c = 0.370, β = 0.346, l = 0.
Using these distribution fits, we choose our preliminary threshold as the intersection point of the two fitted probability distribution functions, as shown in Fig. 9 . In this way, assuming that a computed preliminary statistic comes from either the spoofed probability distribution or the authentic probability distribution, we choose our threshold to maximize the conditional probability of the statistic. That is, if our computed preliminary statistic lies above the threshold, we determine that the receiver is most likely authentic according to this probability model. Otherwise, if it lies below, we conclude that it is more likely to be spoofed. Preliminary threshold determined to maximize the conditional probability of obtaining a given computed preliminary statistic. If the preliminary statistic lies above the threshold, we determine the receiver is more likely to be authentic; otherwise, we conclude it is more likely to be spoofed.
Applying our preliminary threshold on a separate, 20-second segment of data during spoofing, in Fig. 10a , the cumulative statistic for the western U.S. receiver in the western United States, which was spoofed, lies below the threshold by a significant margin, whereas the statistic for the authentic receivers consistently remained above. Similarly in Fig. 10b , for the South American receiver network, all three stations had measurements which similarly remained significantly above the threshold. For the authentic receivers, the statistic was consistently significantly above the threshold, thus allowing for an accurate preliminary spoofing decision. In comparison, the statistic for the western U.S. receiver was consistently below the threshold, indicating a "spoofed" preliminary spoofing decision for this receiver.
Verifying Preliminary Spoofing Decision with Distant Representative Snippets
To verify the preliminary spoofing decisions, for each authentication time, we generate a snippet representative of the signal obtained by the receivers determined to be authentic in the U.S. region (Illinois, Colorado, and Ohio). Then this signal, as well as the original spoofed signal from the western U.S. receiver are both compared with a representative signal snippet from the South American region. For the secondary statistic computation, we chose our narrow filter window to be 3 samples in width. Similar to the preliminary statistic threshold determination process, we examine the same 140 seconds of spoofing data and computing the secondary statistics for both the authentic signal as well as the spoofed signal. We again observe that these statistics appear to come from two separate distributions, resembling a gamma distribution function, as plotted in Fig. 11 . Using the same generalized gamma distribution probability density function as expressed in Eq. (31), the distribution for the authentic secondary statistics had parameters α = 1.53, c = 1.74, β = 33.7, and l = 20.0, whereas the distribution for the spoofed secondary statistics, the distribution fit had parameters α = 1.18, c = 2.69, β = 5.80, l = 13.7.
Using these distribution fits, we similarly choose our secondary threshold as the intersection point of the two fitted probability distribution functions in order to maximize the conditional probability of the statistic, as shown in Fig. 12 . Thus, if our computed secondary statistic lies above the threshold, we determine that the GPS signal is most likely authentic according to this probability model. Otherwise, if it lies below, we conclude that it is more likely to be spoofed. Figure 12 : Secondary threshold determined to maximize the conditional probability of obtaining a given computed secondary statistic. If the secondary statistic lies above the threshold, we determine the GPS signal is more likely to be authentic; otherwise, we conclude it is more likely to be spoofed.
Finally, we apply our secondary threshold on the same 20-second segment of data during spoofing, which was separate from the data used to create the probability model. We observe that with our computed secondary statistics, by comparing with the distant network sites, we accurately verify the authenticity preliminarily determined for each receiver. In particular, the snippet representing the GPS signal obtained by the initially authenticated receivers in the U.S. region (Illinois, Colorado, and Ohio) generates a significant correlation with the representative snippet from the South American region, indicating a match between the distant sites and confirming that these receivers are indeed authentic. In comparison, the GPS signal obtained at the Western U.S. receiver has a secondary statistic which lies below the threshold, indicating a poor match between this receiver with those from the South American regional network, confirming that this receiver is indeed spoofed. Secondary statistic for U.S. regionally representative snippet and western U.S. receiver snippet, which was computed as peak-tonoise ratio from correlation with South American regionally representative snippet for PRN 26, the only common satellite signal observed between both regional networks. We observe that this statistic was significantly above the threshold between the two regionally representative snippets, whereas for the western U.S. receiver, the statistic was significantly below the threshold, indicating a poor match with the authenticated receivers in the South American region.
Between the two regional networks of receiver stations, the receivers only observed one common PRN due to the significant separation of the regional networks. Despite being a lower elevation satellite for all receivers, we were still able to observe distinguishing secondary statistics.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we propose a hybrid architecture based on the NASPInet communication structure to detect a spoofing attack on PMU devices in the power grid network. Our approach also defends against a more sophisticated, coordinated spoofing attack within a regional network, while reducing bandwidth and processing requirements by using a regionally representative snippet sample to send to distant sites. Additionally, we demonstrate our algorithm successfully operates on a network of wide-spread receivers during a government-sponsored live spoofing event, by detecting signal manipulation on the victim receiver, while simultaneously authenticating the other receivers in the hybrid network.
